Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation

International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. En...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 118; no. 11; pp. 1 - 6
Main Authors Schmidt, Klaus M., Ockenfels, Axel
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States National Academy of Sciences 16.03.2021
Subjects
Climate change
Climate policy
Cooperation
Disarmament
Emissions
Environmental policy
Free trade
Greenhouse gases
International cooperation
International trade
Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations
Public participation
Social Sciences
common commitment
climate policy
cooperation
negotiation design
reciprocity
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Summary:International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29–49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced.
Bibliography:Edited by Lise Vesterlund, University of Pittsburgh, and accepted by Editorial Board Member Paul R. Milgrom January 22, 2021 (received for review June 23, 2020)
Author contributions: K.M.S. and A.O. designed research; K.M.S. and A.O. performed research; K.M.S. analyzed data; and K.M.S. and A.O. wrote the paper.
ISSN:0027-8424
1091-6490
DOI:10.1073/pnas.2013070118