Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inReview of industrial organization Vol. 59; no. 1; pp. 1 - 12
Main Authors Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus, Wey, Christian
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, NY Springer US 01.08.2021
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Acquisitions & mergers
Antitrust
Bureaucrats
Competition
Competition policy
Delegation
Economics
Economics and Finance
Efficiency
Incentives
Industrial Organization
Merger control
Merger remedies
Microeconomics
Production
Welfare
Merger control
L40
K21
Merger remedies
Antitrust
L13
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Summary:We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
ISSN:1573-7160
0889-938X
1573-7160
DOI:10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2