Resource scarcity and democratic elections in commons dilemmas: An experiment on forest use in Ethiopia

• Published in: Ecological economics Vol. 114; pp. 199 - 207
• Main Authors: Gatiso, Tsegaye T., Vollan, Björn, Nuppenau, Ernst-August
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.06.2015
• Subjects: Adaptation; Adaptation to change; Behavioral experiment; Cooperation; Crowding-out effect; Democratic elected sanctions; Elections; Environmental economics; Ethiopia; Forest commons; Forest management; Forests; human behavior; issues and policy; Men; motivation; Resource scarcity; Sanctions (international law); Trees; Ethiopia; Forest commons; Crowding-out effect; Behavioral experiment; Cooperation; Resource scarcity; Ethiopia; Adaptation; Democratic elected sanctions
• ISSN: 0921-8009
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.005

We study the effect of resource scarcity on human behavior using dynamic lab-in-the-field experiments which are framed around the extraction of trees from a communally managed forest in Ethiopia. Subjects who faced resource scarcity were less cooperative than those who faced more abundant commons condition. When initial condition of the commons was relatively abundant it seemed more likely that resource users established a norm of reciprocity. We further found that especially men overharvested under resource scarcity which is in line with studies that had found men to be more competitive. We also tested different policies. We found that gaining legitimacy through election increases cooperation independent of whether the resource is scarce or abundant. When sanctions were imposed we observed a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation to cooperate under resource abundance. With resource scarcity imposed sanctions did not lead to a crowding-out effect but democratic elections were by far more effective.