Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways

People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inMemory & cognition Vol. 50; no. 6; pp. 1319 - 1335
Main Authors Burnell, Ryan, Nash, Robert A., Umanath, Sharda, Garry, Maryanne
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.08.2022
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
content type line 23
ISSN:0090-502X
1532-5946
1532-5946
DOI:10.3758/s13421-022-01328-9