Correlated Equilibrium of Cournot Oligopoly Competition

This paper shows that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, for the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric, linear costs.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic theory Vol. 68; no. 2; pp. 544 - 548
Main Author Liu, Luchuan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.02.1996
Elsevier
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
SeriesJournal of Economic Theory
Subjects
Competition
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Oligopoly
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Summary:This paper shows that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, for the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric, linear costs.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1006/jeth.1996.0030