Why Theory of Mind Is Not Enough to Understand Others?

• Published in: Behavioral sciences Vol. 13; no. 1; p. 12
• Main Authors: Sanhueza, María Isabel, Fossa, Pablo
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Switzerland MDPI AG 23.12.2022; MDPI
• Subjects: Adaptation; Behavior; Cognition & reasoning; Cognitive ability; Cognitive development; Consciousness; Developmental psychology; Emotions; Executive function; Hypothesis; intuition; Metacognition; Phenomenology; Philosophy; pre-reflective consciousness; Psychological research; reflective consciousness; Reflexivity; Subjectivity; Theoretical constructs; theory of mind; United Kingdom; Spain; phenomenology; theory of mind; intuition; pre-reflective consciousness; reflective consciousness
• ISSN: 2076-328X; 2076-328X
• DOI: 10.3390/bs13010012

Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit one's own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of one's own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, sub-dimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding one's own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.