Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs

This paper extends the standard matching model by adding match-specific costs, which can only be partially protected from hold-up because of workers' bargaining power. We show that a decrease in equilibrium unemployment might improve welfare for realistic values of workers' bargaining powe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 176 - 183
Main Author Cheron, A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.08.2005
Elsevier
SeriesEconomics Letters
Subjects
Bargaining
Costs
Economic theory
Hiring cost
Hold-up
Job search
Labour economics
Matching
Mathematical models
Unemployment
Workers' representation
Matching
Hold-up
Hiring cost
E24
J41
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Summary:This paper extends the standard matching model by adding match-specific costs, which can only be partially protected from hold-up because of workers' bargaining power. We show that a decrease in equilibrium unemployment might improve welfare for realistic values of workers' bargaining power.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.007