Fair division theory and climate change policy
This paper analyzes the fair division of common property resources when monetary compensations are feasible. A prominent example is the fair division of the atmosphere's limited absorptive capacity for greenhouse gases. I propose a solution that is Pareto efficient and satisfies the axiomatic f...
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Published in | Environment and development economics Vol. 13; no. 4; pp. 441 - 455 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Cambridge, UK
Cambridge University Press
01.08.2008
Cambridage University Press |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper analyzes the fair division of common property resources when monetary compensations are feasible. A prominent example is the fair division of the atmosphere's limited absorptive capacity for greenhouse gases. I propose a solution that is Pareto efficient and satisfies the axiomatic fair division criteria of individual rationality, stand-alone upper bound, and a version of envy-freeness. The latter criterion is adapted to problems where monetary compensations can be used to facilitate the fair division of the common resource. Applied to climate change, the solution implies that developing countries should participate in emission reduction efforts, but should be fully compensated for their incremental abatement costs. |
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Bibliography: | ark:/67375/6GQ-1CHVXBDQ-G istex:4288D1D492CF7CF8CD670CC33C3ADAEF221BF737 ArticleID:00444 Part of this paper was written while I was visiting the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Osaka University, Japan. I am grateful for the great hospitality which I received there. I would also like to thank Masaki Aoyagi, Bertrand Koebel, Anja Schöttner and three anonymous referees for valuable comments. PII:S1355770X08004440 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 1355-770X 1469-4395 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S1355770X08004440 |