Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness

We show that any voting rule satisfying unanimity and candidate stability (meaning that no candidate gains by withdrawing from the election) satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies candidate stability theorem of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 190 - 195
Main Author Samejima, Yusuke
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.08.2005
Elsevier
SeriesEconomics Letters
Subjects
Axiomatic approach
Candidates
Economic theory
Election
Elections
Mathematical models
Political economy
Social choice
Voting behaviour
Social choice
Axiomatic approach
Political economy
Election
D72
D71
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Summary:We show that any voting rule satisfying unanimity and candidate stability (meaning that no candidate gains by withdrawing from the election) satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies candidate stability theorem of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017