Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
We show that any voting rule satisfying unanimity and candidate stability (meaning that no candidate gains by withdrawing from the election) satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies candidate stability theorem of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton.
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Published in | Economics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 190 - 195 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Elsevier B.V
01.08.2005
Elsevier |
Series | Economics Letters |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We show that any voting rule satisfying unanimity and candidate stability (meaning that no candidate gains by withdrawing from the election) satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem implies candidate stability theorem of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017 |