Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination

A uniform pricing rule may enable the communication of demand information from buyer to seller in situations where this would not have been possible if the seller could price discriminate. Importantly, such a rule can benefit both buyer and seller.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 99; no. 3; pp. 421 - 424
Main Authors Frisell, Lars, Lagerlöf, Johan N.M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.06.2008
Elsevier
SeriesEconomics Letters
Subjects
Cheap talk
Demand
Imperfect information
Incomplete information
Price discrimination
Uncertainty
Welfare
Uncertainty
Welfare
L42
Incomplete information
Cheap talk
L11
Price discrimination
D82
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Summary:A uniform pricing rule may enable the communication of demand information from buyer to seller in situations where this would not have been possible if the seller could price discriminate. Importantly, such a rule can benefit both buyer and seller.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.025