A Moral Fine-Tuning Argument

This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the sign...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inReligions (Basel, Switzerland ) Vol. 15; no. 1; p. 31
Main Author Jakobsen, Martin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI AG 01.12.2023
Subjects
Analysis
Argument (Philosophy)
Book publishing
Cognitive ability
Epistemology
fine-tuning argument
Hypotheses
metaethics
moral argument
Morality
natural theology
Naturalism
non-naturalism
Rationality
Realism
theistic argument
Norway
United Kingdom
Bermuda
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Summary:This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg.
ISSN:2077-1444
2077-1444
DOI:10.3390/rel15010031