Inducing Supply Chain Transparency through Supplier Encroachment

• Published in: Production and operations management Vol. 29; no. 3; pp. 725 - 749
• Main Authors: Guan, Xu, Liu, Baoshan, Chen, Ying‐ju, Wang, Hongwei
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.03.2020; Blackwell Publishers Inc
• Subjects: channel structure; Consumer attitudes; Disclosure; encroachment; game theory; information transparency; quality disclosure; Retailing industry; Suppliers; Supply chains; information transparency; channel structure; encroachment; quality disclosure; game theory
• ISSN: 1059-1478; 1937-5956
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.13133

This study investigates a supplier’s voluntary disclosure strategy when it can encroach on a retailer’s operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of a direct sales channel expands market potential, induces the supplier to adopt a more frequent disclosure strategy, and ultimately leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of a dual channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier’s disclosure to enhance consumers’ quality expectations. In most cases, such a free‐riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier’s encroachment. Conversely, more transparent product quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, who can then no longer hide negative quality information from consumers due to the potential change in the channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier’s ex ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and that the supplier may commit not to encroach on the retail market, even when it has a free option to open a direct sales channel.