In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

:  In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does no...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMind & language Vol. 20; no. 2; pp. 163 - 188
Main Authors Bayne, Tim, Pacherie, Elisabeth
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK; Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc 01.04.2005
Blackwell
Subjects
Beliefs
Clinical psychology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Human behaviour
Imagination
Logic
Mental illness
Patients
Philosophy
Symbolism
Belief
Illusion
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Summary::  In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.
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ArticleID:MILA281
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ObjectType-Article-2
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ISSN:0268-1064
1468-0017
DOI:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x