“Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration

Existing theories of regional integration do not satisfactorily explain European legal integration. Like the bears’ porridge, one explains too much, another too little, and yet another requires unnecessary information. Constitutional economics, viewing regional integration as a process producing a c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inConstitutional political economy Vol. 17; no. 1; pp. 15 - 29
Main Author Griffith, Nathan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer 01.03.2006
Springer Nature B.V
SeriesConstitutional Political Economy
Subjects
Constitution
Constitutional law
Decision making
Delegation of authority
Europe
European integration
European Union
Externality
H10
Integration
International law
International relations
Law
Legal aspects
Political economy
Political Integration
Regional integration
Regionalism
Sovereignty
Studies
Supranationalism
Treaties
Europe
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Summary:Existing theories of regional integration do not satisfactorily explain European legal integration. Like the bears’ porridge, one explains too much, another too little, and yet another requires unnecessary information. Constitutional economics, viewing regional integration as a process producing a constitution, is able to explain both momentum toward and resistance to legal integration in a parsimonious fashion. Further, it produces a unique analysis of the current circumstances of European legal integration, revealing that the Kompetenz–Kompetenz debate addresses the fundamental dilemma of compound republics. This also discloses that European integration has produced a novel answer to this old question. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006
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ISSN:1043-4062
1572-9966
DOI:10.1007/s10602-006-6791-0