Corporate Governance and Tobin's Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance

This empirical study examines the relationship between corporate governance and organizational performance (OP), measured using Tobin's Q (TQ) in the context of an emerging economy for which, as yet, only a handful of studies have been conducted. We employ a system generalized method of moments...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inBritish journal of management Vol. 29; no. 1; pp. 171 - 190
Main Authors Singh, Satwinder, Tabassum, Naeem, Darwish, Tamer K., Batsakis, Georgios
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.01.2018
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Summary:This empirical study examines the relationship between corporate governance and organizational performance (OP), measured using Tobin's Q (TQ) in the context of an emerging economy for which, as yet, only a handful of studies have been conducted. We employ a system generalized method of moments approach controlling for endogeneity and test it on a newly created dataset comprising 324 listed firms in Pakistan. We find that board size, number of board committees and ownership concentration are positively linked with high TQ ratio, whilst board independence and CEO duality display a negative relationship. In terms of moderating effects, we find that ownership concentration negatively moderates the relationship between board independence and OP, as well as that of CEO duality and OP. The relationship between the number of board committees and OP is positively moderated by ownership concentration. Our findings contribute towards a better articulation and application of a more concrete measure of OP − that of the TQ ratio − whilst, at the same time, testing the board composition–performance relationship in the context of an upcoming and increasingly important emerging market. Wider applicability of results and policy implications are discussed.
ISSN:1045-3172
1467-8551
DOI:10.1111/1467-8551.12237