Game-theoretic-based modelling of Krishna waters dispute: equilibrium solutions by Metagame Analysis

• Published in: The European physical journal. B, Condensed matter physics Vol. 94; no. 5
• Main Authors: Panday, Durga Prasad, Khosa, Rakesh, Maheswaran, Rathinasamy, Ravikumar, K., Agarwal, Ankit
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.05.2021; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Complex Systems; Condensed Matter Physics; Conflict management; Conflict resolution; Equilibrium; Evolutionary Game Theory; Fluid- and Aerodynamics; Game theory; Negotiations; Physics; Physics and Astronomy; Players; Regular Article - Statistical and Nonlinear Physics; River basins; Rivers; Solid State Physics; Strategy
• ISSN: 1434-6028; 1434-6036
• DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00107-w

Conflicts are inevitable concerning sharing of the resources. Most of the time, due to the opacity of the conflict resolution technique, players involved do not accept the final solution. Therefore, any method adopted for resolving a conflict should involve players to get the equilibrium solution. Besides, the conflict resolution technique needs to be transparent, and the procedure must be the same for all the players involved. Metagame Analysis has the potential to accommodate the above conditions. In this study, we have discussed Metagame Analysis and its application to resolve India’s Krishna river basin dispute. Since the environment is an integral part of the river ecosystem, it has also been included as a conflict resolution player. We have also defined and derived Fair and Equitable (F&E) allocation in this regard, considering the factors that form the basis for their right as a rightful owner of the resource. The factors considered for F&E allocation are drainage area, cultivable area, and virgin runoff. The derived F&E allocation is then selected as one of the options for the Metagame Analysis. Metagame Analysis is carried out using two scenarios before and after Andhra Pradesh’s reorganization (in 2014). In scenario 1, equilibrium outcomes are 454, 458, and 469. Our results show that excessive demands may harm the water allocation if it violates the total flow. Outcome 469 is the F&E outcome in which all the players are going for cooperated negotiations which maximize their share. Outcomes 454 and 458 are those outcomes in which Karnataka is benefitted as it is getting its first option share. AP’s demand cannot be accommodated in any strategy as it exceeds the total flow, while there is a strategy available in which Karnataka’s first option can be sustained. The paper shows that the game-theoretic-based techniques can solve real-world disputes and that too as complex as water sharing. Graphic abstract