Pricing Regulation under Bypass Competition

We analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long-distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and also has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers....

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Rand journal of economics Vol. 29; no. 2; pp. 259 - 279
Main Authors Curien, Nicolas, Jullien, Bruno, Rey, Patrick
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Santa Monica Rand 01.07.1998
Corp
The RAND Corporation
Rand Corporation
SeriesRAND Journal of Economics
Subjects
Budget constraints
Competition
Consumer economics
Consumer prices
Economic competition
Economic models
Economic theory
Information
Marginal costs
Market share
Monopolies
Monopoly
Netzregulierung
Price regulation
Price regulations
Pricing
Pricing policies
Regulation
Regulierung
Studies
Tariffs
Technology
Telecommunications
Telecommunications industry
Telekommunikation
Telekommunikationspreis
Theorie
United States > US
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0741-6261
1756-2171
DOI10.2307/2555888

Cover

More Information
Summary:We analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long-distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and also has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers. We then study how competition in bypass affects the optimal nonlinear pricing policy and the resulting allocation. When transfers are allowed between the regulator and the network operator, bypass competition benefits consumers at the expense of the taxpayer, otherwise it benefits large consumers but hurts small ones.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0741-6261
1756-2171
DOI:10.2307/2555888