Market Impact on IT Security Spending
ABSTRACT Traditionally, IT security investment decisions are made in isolation. However, as firms that compete for customers in an industry are closely interlinked, a macro perspective is needed in analyzing these decisions. We utilize the notions of direct‐ and cross‐risk elasticity to describe the...
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Published in | Decision sciences Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 517 - 556 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Atlanta
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.06.2013
American Institute for Decision Sciences |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | ABSTRACT
Traditionally, IT security investment decisions are made in isolation. However, as firms that compete for customers in an industry are closely interlinked, a macro perspective is needed in analyzing these decisions. We utilize the notions of direct‐ and cross‐risk elasticity to describe the customer response to adverse IT security events in the firm and competitor, respectively, thus allowing us to analyze optimal security investment decisions. Examining both symmetric and asymmetric duopoly cases using a continuous‐time Markov chain (CTMC) model, we demonstrate that optimal IT security spending, expected firm profits and willingness of firms to cooperate on security improvements are highly dependent on the nature of customer response to adverse events. We also examine the investment problem when security attacks on different firms are correlated. |
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Bibliography: | ArticleID:DECI12023 The authors would like to thank the research workshop participants at the University of Calgary, University of Alberta and University of California Riverside, as well as the reviewers and associate editor for their insightful comments on this article. ark:/67375/WNG-TWLFFG4L-L istex:29A9847EE4399B09EC8ED451374D497611D9B778 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0011-7315 1540-5915 |
DOI: | 10.1111/deci.12023 |