Enforcement costs and regulatory reform: The agency and firm response

Influenced by models of optimal law enforcement, several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance. However, most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the fi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of environmental economics and management Vol. 11; no. 4; pp. 327 - 346
Main Authors Linder, Stephen H., McBride, Mark E.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.12.1984
Elsevier
Academic Press
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
SeriesJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subjects
Compliance
Decision making models
Emissions
Enforcement
Expected values
Pollution control costs
Probability
Regulation
Regulatory agencies
Regulatory reform
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Summary:Influenced by models of optimal law enforcement, several authors have recently revised the work on efficient levels of regulatory control to accommodate the realities of underenforcement and imperfect compliance. However, most of these efforts have centered on either the enforcement agency or the firm and have largely ignored the decentralized nature of the enforcement process. This paper extends these results by modelling both the firm and the local agency and by incorporating detection uncertainty and concealment activity. Each model is then evaluated with respect to the alternative regulatory regimes of direct controls and emission taxes.
ISSN:0095-0696
1096-0449
DOI:10.1016/0095-0696(84)90003-2