Self-selection into laboratory experiments: pro-social motives versus monetary incentives

Laboratory experiments have become a wide-spread tool in economic research. Yet, there is still doubt about how well the results from lab experiments generalize to other settings. In this paper, we investigate the self-selection process of potential subjects into the subject pool. We alter the recru...

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Published inExperimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 18; no. 2; pp. 195 - 214
Main Authors Abeler, Johannes, Nosenzo, Daniele
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.06.2015
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI10.1007/s10683-014-9397-9

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Summary:Laboratory experiments have become a wide-spread tool in economic research. Yet, there is still doubt about how well the results from lab experiments generalize to other settings. In this paper, we investigate the self-selection process of potential subjects into the subject pool. We alter the recruitment email sent to first-year students, either mentioning the monetary reward associated with participation in experiments; or appealing to the importance of helping research; or both. We find that the sign-up rate drops by two-thirds if we do not mention monetary rewards. Appealing to subjects’ willingness to help research has no effect on sign-up. We then invite the so-recruited subjects to the laboratory to measure their pro-social and approval motivations using incentivized experiments. We do not find any differences between the groups, suggesting that neither adding an appeal to help research, nor mentioning monetary incentives affects the level of social preferences and approval seeking of experimental subjects.
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ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-014-9397-9