The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments
► We investigate the consistency of behavior between a form of strategy method and the direct response method. ► We find rather consistent behavior, in particular in the late periods of the repeated game and in the one shot game. ► Inconsistent behavior occurs mainly in the first part of the experim...
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Published in | Journal of economic psychology Vol. 33; no. 4; pp. 897 - 913 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.08.2012
Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0167-4870 1872-7719 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2012.04.002 |
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Summary: | ► We investigate the consistency of behavior between a form of strategy method and the direct response method. ► We find rather consistent behavior, in particular in the late periods of the repeated game and in the one shot game. ► Inconsistent behavior occurs mainly in the first part of the experiment and can be attributed to strategic behavior.
We compare the strategy method and the direct response method in public good experiments in a within-subject design. This comparison is interesting because the strategy method is frequently used to investigate preference heterogeneity. We find that people identified by the strategy method as conditional cooperators also behave as conditional cooperators under the direct response method. Free-rider types contribute systematically less than all others. Overall, our results support the behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments. |
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Bibliography: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0167-4870 1872-7719 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.joep.2012.04.002 |