Discrimination in waiting times by insurance type and financial soundness of German acute care hospitals

• Published in: The European journal of health economics Vol. 12; no. 5; pp. 405 - 416
• Main Authors: Schwierz, Christoph, Wübker, Achim, Wübker, Ansgar, Kuchinke, Björn A.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.10.2011; Springer-Verlag; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Algorithms; Ambulatory care; Balance sheets; Capacity utilization; Conization; Default insurance; Disability insurance; Discrimination; Economic Policy; Emergency Service, Hospital - economics; Germany; Health Care Management; Health care waiting times; Health Economics; Health insurance; Hospital utilization rate; Hospitals; Hospitals, Private - economics; Hospitals, Public - economics; Humans; Incentives; Insurance, Health; Intensive care; Interviews as Topic; Length of stay; Medicine; Medicine & Public Health; Nonprofit hospitals; Original Paper; Pathologic constriction; Patients; Pharmacoeconomics and Health Outcomes; Prejudice; Private Sector; Prospective payment systems; Psychiatric hospitals; Public Finance; Public Health; Reimbursement; Studies; Surveys and Questionnaires; Waiting Lists; Germany; I11; German acute care hospitals; I10; Private health insurance; D21; Waiting time
• ISSN: 1618-7598; 1618-7601
• DOI: 10.1007/s10198-010-0254-2

This paper shows that patients with private health insurance (PHI) are being offered significantly shorter waiting times than patients with statutory health insurance (SHI) in German acute hospital care. This behavior may be driven by the higher expected profitability of PHI relative to SHI holders. Further, we find that hospitals offering private insurees shorter waiting times when compared with SHI holders have a significantly better financial performance than those abstaining from or with less discrimination.