Bargaining, Coalitions and Local Expenditure

We extend the literature on local expenditure determination by showing that bargaining and grand coalition seem to facilitate collective decision-making in an assembly of elected councillors. We demonstrate that the solution of the game turns on the principle of equal relative concession. Based on l...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inUrban studies (Edinburgh, Scotland) Vol. 38; no. 13; pp. 2379 - 2391
Main Authors Gangopadhyay, Partha, Nath, Shyam
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England Carfax Publishing, Taylor & Francis Ltd 01.12.2001
SAGE Publications
Longman Group
Sage Publications Ltd
Subjects
Administration
Asia
Bgi / Prodig
Cities
Decision making
Developing countries
Efficiency
Expenditures
Government bureaucracy
Government Spending
Group Decision Making
Human geography
Income level
India
Indian subcontinent. Himalaya
Local Government
Negotiation
Politicians
Primary education
Public expenditure
Public goods
Road maintenance
Subnational government
Urban government
Urban policy
Voting
Water supply
Calcutta
Delhi
Bombay
India
Urban infrastructure
Local government
Urban policy
Political behaviour
Model
Income redistribution
Electorate
Public expenditure
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We extend the literature on local expenditure determination by showing that bargaining and grand coalition seem to facilitate collective decision-making in an assembly of elected councillors. We demonstrate that the solution of the game turns on the principle of equal relative concession. Based on limited experimentation, we assess the performance of local governments and find that group dominance frustrates local expenditure efficiency in urban localities of India.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:0042-0980
1360-063X
DOI:10.1080/00420980120094560