Farsighted Rationality in Hedonic Games

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which a coalition chooses for each partition of the player set the probability with which it forms and thereby destroys the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players know at every partition what future parti...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inDynamic games and applications Vol. 13; no. 2; pp. 462 - 479
Main Authors Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-Herman, Karos, Dominik
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.06.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Coalitions
Communications Engineering
Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks
Decision making
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Game Theory
Group Formation and Farsightedness
Management Science
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Networks
Operations Research
Players
Probability
Social and Behav. Sciences
C71
Farsighted stability
Coalition stable equilibrium
Abstract games
Hedonic games
C72
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Summary:We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which a coalition chooses for each partition of the player set the probability with which it forms and thereby destroys the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players know at every partition what future partitions, and hence payoffs, will be reached with what probability. Thus, players can make rational decisions about the moves they support. We show that if coalitions make mistakes with small but positive probability, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
ISSN:2153-0785
2153-0793
DOI:10.1007/s13235-022-00474-8