Loss aversion in social image concerns

Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly report...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inExperimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 622 - 645
Main Authors Petrishcheva, Vasilisa, Riener, Gerhard, Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.07.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Discontinuity
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Experiments
Game Theory
Intelligence
Laboratories
Lying
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social image
C91
Laboratory experiment
Lying behavior
D91
Social image concerns
Loss aversion
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Summary:Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.
ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-022-09782-7