Traditional Conceptions of the Legal Person and Nonhuman Animals

Since Roman law, the category of the legal person has been the most relevant legal category, allowing humans and entities to act within the law and enter into legal relations. The legal system does not consider nonhuman animals as legal persons but as property or as sentient beings regulated by the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAnimals (Basel) Vol. 12; no. 19; p. 2590
Main Author Montes Franceschini, Macarena
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI AG 28.09.2022
MDPI
Subjects
Animals
capacity
Dogs
Families & family life
Kelsen
legal personhood
nonhuman animals
Personhood
Philosophy
role
Roles
Society
status
United States > US
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Summary:Since Roman law, the category of the legal person has been the most relevant legal category, allowing humans and entities to act within the law and enter into legal relations. The legal system does not consider nonhuman animals as legal persons but as property or as sentient beings regulated by the rules of property. Throughout history, there have been different concepts of the legal person, and some are still relevant today. This article examines four traditional concepts of legal personhood, arguing that nonhuman animals can be considered persons according to each concept. The article reaches three main conclusions. First, the legal person is not the same as the human. Second, the debate between the equivalence and the subset views poses a dilemma between a revolution or the reform of animals’ legal status. Third, an ecumenical defense of animal legal personhood may benefit animals as it supports animal persons according to any of the traditional concepts of legal personhood.
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ISSN:2076-2615
2076-2615
DOI:10.3390/ani12192590