Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inCurrent directions in psychological science : a journal of the American Psychological Society Vol. 28; no. 5; pp. 503 - 509
Main Authors De Neys, Wim, Pennycook, Gordon
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.10.2019
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Association for Psychological Science
Subjects
Cognition & reasoning
Humanities and Social Sciences
dual-process theory
reasoning
decision making
bias
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Summary:Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.
ISSN:0963-7214
1467-8721
DOI:10.1177/0963721419855658