Revisiting industrial democracy and pension trusteeship: The case of Canada

This article examines the extent to which industrial democracy theory may be applied to the operation of Canadian pension fund boards by analysing the balance of power between employers, employees and unions on joint consultative private and public sector pension boards in Ontario and Quebec. The ar...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomic and industrial democracy Vol. 32; no. 3; pp. 477 - 497
Main Authors Sayce, Susan, Gold, Michael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England SAGE Publications 01.08.2011
Sage Publications Ltd
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Summary:This article examines the extent to which industrial democracy theory may be applied to the operation of Canadian pension fund boards by analysing the balance of power between employers, employees and unions on joint consultative private and public sector pension boards in Ontario and Quebec. The article focuses on three indicators of industrial democracy: shareholder activism; involvement in fund investment policies (including socially responsible investment); and forms of collective action to invest pension funds in support of union objectives. It concludes that industrial democracy is stronger where it is supported by traditions of tripartism and concertation and by statutory employee rights to representation on private sector funds. Its conclusions also question whether Canada can be classed unequivocally as a ‘liberal market economy’, on the grounds that the economic regulatory regime in Quebec differs substantially from the rest of the country.
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ISSN:0143-831X
1461-7099
DOI:10.1177/0143831X10387838