SUBJECTIVE RIGHTNESS

• Published in: Social philosophy & policy Vol. 27; no. 2; pp. 64 - 110
• Main Author: Smith, Holly M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.07.2010
• Subjects: 20th century; Beliefs; Criteria; Ethics; History of philosophy; Judgement; Judgment; Morality; Objectivity; Philosophers; Philosophy; Sociology; Subjectivity; Twentieth Century
• ISSN: 0265-0525; 1471-6437
• DOI: 10.1017/S0265052509990161

Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who may be uncertain about the circumstances in which she acts, and hence is unable to use her standard moral principle directly in deciding what to do. This paper distinguishes two important senses of “moral guidance”; proposes criteria of adequacy for accounts of subjective rightness; canvasses existing definitions for “subjective rightness”; finds them all deficient; and proposes a new and more successful account. It argues that each comprehensive moral theory must include multiple principles of subjective rightness to address the epistemic situations of the full range of moral decision-makers, and shows that accounts of subjective rightness formulated in terms of what it would reasonable for the agent to believe cannot provide that guidance.