Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences

In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 123; no. 1/2; pp. 171 - 196
Main Authors Poulsen, Anders U., Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.04.2005
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
1130
1200
9130
Biological altruism
Cooperation
Cultural Capital
Economic equilibrium
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Experimental/theoretical
Game theory
Imperfect information
Knowledge Utilization
Line segments
Materialism
Matrix
Money
Nash equilibrium
Population
Preferences
Prisoner's dilemma
Prisoners dilemma
Public choice
Social capital
Social evolution
Social policy
Studies
Taxpaying
Welfare economics
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Summary:In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other's preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society's ability to generate cooperative outcomes.
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ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0