Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

• Published in: New journal of physics Vol. 22; no. 2; pp. 23012 - 23026
• Main Authors: Xiao, Zhilong, Chen, Xiaojie, Szolnoki, Attila
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Bristol IOP Publishing 01.02.2020
• Subjects: Cooperation; Defections; Evolution; evolutionary dynamics; individual migration; orientation-driven migration; Physics; public goods
• ISSN: 1367-2630; 1367-2630
• DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/ab6a3b

Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games.