On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index

We address the problem of extending the Shapley–Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 105; pp. 148 - 154
Main Authors Álvarez-Mozos, M., Alonso-Meijide, J.M., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.09.2017
Elsevier
Subjects
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Economia matemàtica
Externality-free value
Game theory
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Mathematical economics
Partition function
Shapley–Shubik index
Teoria de jocs
Externality-free value
Partition function
C71
Shapley–Shubik index
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Summary:We address the problem of extending the Shapley–Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.009