A cost allocation problem arising in hub–spoke network systems

This paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub–spoke network systems. When a large-scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents, both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues. We formulate this problem as a cooperative game an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean journal of operational research Vol. 160; no. 3; pp. 821 - 838
Main Authors Matsubayashi, Nobuo, Umezawa, Masashi, Masuda, Yasushi, Nishino, Hisakazu
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2005
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Subjects
Core allocation
Cost allocation
Game theory
Hub–spoke network system
Non-excludability
Studies
Telecommunication network
Telecommunications
Cost allocation
Non-excludability
Hub–spoke network system
Game theory
Core allocation
Telecommunication network
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Summary:This paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub–spoke network systems. When a large-scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents, both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues. We formulate this problem as a cooperative game and analyze the core allocation, which is a widely used solution concept. The core of this game is not necessarily non-empty as shown by an example. A reasonable scheme is to allocate the cost proportional to the flow that an agent generates. We show that, if the demand across the system has a block structure and the fixed cost is high, this cost allocation scheme belongs to the core. Numerical experiments are given with real telecommunication traffic data in order to illustrate the usefulness of our analytical findings.
ISSN:0377-2217
1872-6860
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2003.05.002