A CAN-Bus Lightweight Authentication Scheme

The design of the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) did not account for security issues and, consequently, attacks often use external mobile communication interfaces to conduct eavesdropping, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks on a CAN bus, posing a risk to driving safety. Numerous stud...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSensors (Basel, Switzerland) Vol. 21; no. 21; p. 7069
Main Authors Luo, Jia-Ning, Wu, Chang-Ming, Yang, Ming-Hour
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI AG 25.10.2021
MDPI
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Summary:The design of the Controller Area Network (CAN bus) did not account for security issues and, consequently, attacks often use external mobile communication interfaces to conduct eavesdropping, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks on a CAN bus, posing a risk to driving safety. Numerous studies have proposed CAN bus safety improvement techniques that emphasize modifying the original CAN bus method of transmitting frames. These changes place additional computational burdens on electronic control units cause the CAN bus to lose the delay guarantee feature. Consequently, we proposed a method that solves these compatibility and security issues. Simple and efficient frame authentication algorithms were used to prevent spoofing and replay attacks. This method is compatible with both CAN bus and CAN-FD protocols and has a lower operand when compared with other methods.
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ISSN:1424-8220
1424-8220
DOI:10.3390/s21217069