Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A Best-Case Scenario

Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 131; no. 3/4; pp. 365 - 386
Main Author Morrison, Kevin M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.06.2007
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Authoritarianism
Democracy
Democratic theory
Democratization
Dictators
Dictatorship
Economic models
Economic resources
Energy resources
Foreign Aid
Income inequality
Income redistribution
Natural Resources
Political economy
Political power
Political revolutions
Political science
Politics
Power
Revenue
Safeguards
Studies
Task forces
Tax rates
Taxation
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Summary:Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies.
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ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1