Punish in public

• Published in: Journal of public economics Vol. 95; no. 7; pp. 1006 - 1017
• Main Authors: Xiao, Erte, Houser, Daniel
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.08.2011; Elsevier
• Series: Journal of Public Economics
• Subjects: Cooperation; Experiments; Norms; Public goods game; Punishment; Punishment Cooperation Norms Public goods game Experiments; Punishment; Norms; Public goods game; Experiments; Cooperation
• ISSN: 0047-2727; 1879-2316
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.021

We report data from public goods games showing that privately-implemented punishment reduces cooperation in relation to a baseline treatment without punishment. When that same incentive is implemented publicly, however, cooperation is sustained at significantly higher rates than in either the baseline or private punishment treatments. Our design ensures that this increased cooperation is not attributable to shame, differences in information or signaling. Rather, our evidence is that the ability to observe the punishment of low-contributors can reverse punishment's detrimental effects. This result has important efficiency implications for the design of mechanisms intended to deter misconduct. ► Publicly, but anonymously, implementation improves the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation. ► The ability to observe the punishment of low-contributors can reverse punishment's detrimental effects. ► Individuals are more likely to obey to the rule enforced by punishment when they more frequently observe the occurrence of punishment.