The Comparative Historical Analysis of Public Management Policy Cycles in France, Italy, and Spain: Symposium Introduction
In recent studies of public management reform in France, Italy, and Spain inspired by historical institutionalism, the Napoleonic tradition is cast as a causal factor whose overwhelming strength explains how these countries' reforms proceed and finish. This symposium pursues the same research i...
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Published in | Governance (Oxford) Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 209 - 223 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Malden, USA
Blackwell Publishing Inc
01.04.2010
Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | In recent studies of public management reform in France, Italy, and Spain inspired by historical institutionalism, the Napoleonic tradition is cast as a causal factor whose overwhelming strength explains how these countries' reforms proceed and finish. This symposium pursues the same research interest in the politics of public management reform and goal of understanding how reforms begin, proceed, and finish in these countries. However, the features of this research project include (1) a focus on instances of public management policymaking, (2) original research on public management reform episodes in each country, and (3) explanatory research arguments that place causation within events. Based on a comparison of explanatory research arguments developed in each case study, the symposium's conclusion extends earlier institutional processualist accounts of causal tendencies of public management policymaking and offers a critique of the historical institutionalist studies mentioned earlier. |
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Bibliography: | ark:/67375/WNG-Q67F1XWW-9 ArticleID:GOVE1476 istex:6A9784960237C3686D7BB804874BB8B430BF28AE ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1 |
ISSN: | 0952-1895 1468-0491 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2010.01476.x |