Metaphor and What is Said
: In this paper, I argue for an account of metaphorical content as what is said when a speaker utters a metaphor. First, I show that two other possibilities—the Gricean account of metaphor as implicature and the strictly semantic account developed by Josef Stern—face several serious problems. In th...
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Published in | Mind & language Vol. 21; no. 3; pp. 310 - 332 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Oxford, UK
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.06.2006
Blackwell |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | : In this paper, I argue for an account of metaphorical content as what is said when a speaker utters a metaphor. First, I show that two other possibilities—the Gricean account of metaphor as implicature and the strictly semantic account developed by Josef Stern—face several serious problems. In their place, I propose an account that takes metaphorical content to cross‐cut the semantic‐pragmatic distinction. This requires re‐thinking the notion of metaphorical content, as well as the relation between the metaphorical and the literal. |
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Bibliography: | istex:39F199B3BDEF8D669C8D267911378BDC837B3ECC ark:/67375/WNG-3B1MFSJ5-7 ArticleID:MILA280 Particular thanks to Catherine Elgin, Richard Heck, Richard Moran, and Rob Stainton for many discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Anne Bezuidenhout, Ishani Maitra, Josef Stern, and an anonymous referee for this journal, as well as audiences at UCLA and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) where this material was presented. This research was funded in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0268-1064 1468-0017 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00280.x |