Heuristics as beliefs and as behaviors: The adaptiveness of the “hot hand”

Gigerenzer (2000) and Anderson (1990) analyzed reasoning by asking: what are the reasoner’s goals? This emphasizes the adaptiveness of behavior rather than whether a belief is normative. Belief in the “hot hand” in basketball suggests that players experiencing streaks should be given more shots, but...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inCognitive psychology Vol. 48; no. 3; pp. 295 - 331
Main Author Burns, Bruce D.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.05.2004
Elsevier
Academic Press
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Summary:Gigerenzer (2000) and Anderson (1990) analyzed reasoning by asking: what are the reasoner’s goals? This emphasizes the adaptiveness of behavior rather than whether a belief is normative. Belief in the “hot hand” in basketball suggests that players experiencing streaks should be given more shots, but this has been seen as a fallacy due to Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) failure to find dependencies between players’ shots. Based on their findings, I demonstrate by Markov modeling and simulation that streaks are valid allocation cues for deciding who to give shots to, because this behavior achieves the team goal of scoring more. Empirically I show that this adaptive heuristic is supported by the fallacious belief in dependency, more so as skill level increases. I extend the theoretical analysis to identify general conditions under which following streaks should be beneficial. Overall, this approach illustrates the advantages of analyzing reasoning in terms of adaptiveness.
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ISSN:0010-0285
1095-5623
DOI:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2003.07.003