Evidence accumulation in decision making: Unifying the take the best and the rational models
An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugal take the best (TTB) model and the alternative rational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates a...
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Published in | Psychonomic bulletin & review Vol. 11; no. 2; pp. 343 - 352 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Austin, TX
Psychonomic Society
01.04.2004
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugal take the best (TTB) model and the alternative rational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates as soon as any evidence in favor of a decision is found and the rational approach as a sequential-sampling process that terminates only when all available information has been assessed. The unified TTB and RAT models were tested in an experiment in which participants learned to make correct judgments for a set of real-world stimuli on the basis of feedback, and were then asked to make additional judgments without feedback for cases in which the TTB and the rational models made different predictions. The results show that, in both experiments, there was strong intraparticipant consistency in the use of either the TTB or the rational model but large interparticipant differences in which model was used. The unified model is shown to be able to capture the differences in decision making across participants in an interpretable way and is preferred by the minimum description length model selection criterion. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 1069-9384 1531-5320 |
DOI: | 10.3758/bf03196581 |