Behavioral spillovers in coordination games

• Published in: European economic review Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 233 - 245
• Main Authors: Cason, Timothy N., Savikhin, Anya C., Sheremeta, Roman M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2012; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Subjects: Behavior; Behavioral spillover; Behaviour in groups; Cooperation; Coordination; Experiments; Game theory; Games; Median game; Minimum game; Order-statistic games; Organizational behaviour; Pareto efficiency; Pareto optimum; Studies; Teamwork; Coordination; Order-statistic games; Cooperation; Median game; Behavioral spillover; C91; Minimum game; Experiments; C72
• ISSN: 0014-2921; 1873-572X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.09.001

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations. ► We experimentally study behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. ► Subjects play minimum- and median-effort games simultaneously and sequentially. ► Efficient coordination in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game. ► Spillover occurs when the games are played sequentially, even if the group changes. ► Uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not affect play in the median game.