Rents, Competition, and Corruption

Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection bet...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe American economic review Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 982 - 993
Main Authors Ades, Alberto, Di Tella, Rafael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Menasha, Wis American Economic Association 01.09.1999
Subjects
Antitrust
Bureaucrats
Competition
Corruption
Data corruption
Economic competition
Economic models
Economic rent
Empirical research
Equilibrium
Government corruption
Gross domestic product
Gross domestic product indices
Imports
Mathematical economics
Minerals
Petroleum industry
Political corruption
Regression analysis
Rent
Statistical analysis
Studies
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Summary:Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.89.4.982