Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design

There is significant variation in the design of military alliances but scholars currently do not have a good understanding of when members choose one design over another. This article argues that alliance design is motivated, at least in part, by reliability considerations. If concerns about opportu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational organization Vol. 66; no. 4; pp. 679 - 707
Main Author Mattes, Michaela
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.10.2012
Subjects
Alliance
Alliances
Armed Forces
Asymmetry
Bargaining
Bilateral aid
Cooperation
Design
Expectations
Hypotheses
Institutionalization
International alliances
International cooperation
International organizations
International relations
Military alliances
Military bases
Military defense
Negotiation
Obligation
Peacetime
Politics
Power
Reliability
Reputation
Reputations
Small States
Studies
Treaties
War
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Summary:There is significant variation in the design of military alliances but scholars currently do not have a good understanding of when members choose one design over another. This article argues that alliance design is motivated, at least in part, by reliability considerations. If concerns about opportunism are high—when prospective members have a history of alliance violation—the signatories should be more willing to implement costly reliability-enhancing provisions such as greater precision in when alliance obligations apply, issue linkage, and increased institutionalization. However, this should be more likely in symmetric alliances where members of similar power levels rely on the support of their partners and thus sensitivity to opportunism is high. In asymmetric alliances, major powers may not find reliability-enhancing provisions necessary and minor powers, who do worry about the reliability of their partners, are unable to force more costly alliance designs given their limited bargaining power. The theoretical expectations are tested using data on bilateral alliances between 1919 and 2001 and the results are generally supportive of the hypotheses.
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ISSN:0020-8183
1531-5088
DOI:10.1017/S002081831200029X