Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14

• Published in: British journal of political science Vol. 36; no. 4; pp. 575 - 591
• Main Authors: McLEAN, IAIN, NOU, JENNIFER
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.10.2006
• Subjects: Balance of power; Common Agricultural Policy; Elections; Electoral systems; Fiscal policy; Government budgets; Land; Land value taxes; Liberalism; Monarchy; Narratives; Parliaments; Political history; Political parties; Political partisanship; Political science; Political systems; Political theory; Politics; Property taxes; Property values; Qualitative research; Tax increases; Taxation; United Kingdom; Veto; Vetoes; Voting; Welfare State; United Kingdom > UK
• ISSN: 0007-1234; 1469-2112
• DOI: 10.1017/S0007123406000317

Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.