More is not necessarily better: Examining the nature of the temporal reference memory component in timing

Three experiments compared the timing performance of humans on a modified temporal generalization task with 1, 3, or 5 presentations of the standard duration. In all three experiments subjects received presentations of a standard duration at the beginning of a trial block and then had to judge wheth...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Quarterly journal of experimental psychology. B, Comparative and physiological psychology Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 321 - 343
Main Authors Jones, Luke A., Wearden, J. H.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England Psychology Press Ltd 01.11.2003
SAGE Publications
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Summary:Three experiments compared the timing performance of humans on a modified temporal generalization task with 1, 3, or 5 presentations of the standard duration. In all three experiments subjects received presentations of a standard duration at the beginning of a trial block and then had to judge whether each of a number of comparison stimuli was or was not the standard. The duration of the standard changed between blocks. The three experiments varied the experimental design (between or within subjects), task difficulty (how closely the comparison stimuli were spaced around the standards), and presence or absence of feedback on performance accuracy. Number of presentations of the standard never affected the proportion of identifications of the standard when it was presented, nor other features of the temporal generalization gradients observed. The implications for the operation of reference memories within the scalar timing system were explored via models that made different assumptions about how the individual presentations of the standard were stored and used.
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ISSN:0272-4995
1464-1321
DOI:10.1080/02724990244000287