Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption

Efforts to control corruption increase levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to reliably and impartially enforce law and the rules of trade. Such trust facilitates the development of arms-length trade and the coordination of complex economic activities. We posit that be...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of business venturing Vol. 24; no. 5; pp. 465 - 476
Main Authors Anokhin, Sergey, Schulze, William S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.09.2009
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Business Venturing
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Summary:Efforts to control corruption increase levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to reliably and impartially enforce law and the rules of trade. Such trust facilitates the development of arms-length trade and the coordination of complex economic activities. We posit that better control of corruption will also be associated with rising levels of innovation and entrepreneurship. Absent such trust, however, monitoring and other transactions cost should restrict the scale and scope of trade and thus, hamper productivity and investment in innovation and entrepreneurship. Longitudinal data from 64 nations lends support to our propositions, thus helping unpack the puzzling relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption.
ISSN:0883-9026
1873-2003
DOI:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.06.001