Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings

In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient matchi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 153; pp. 57 - 60
Main Authors Dworczak, Piotr, Zhang, Anthony Lee
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.04.2017
Elsevier Science Ltd
Subjects
Allocations
Assignment problem
Efficient matchings
Equilibrium
Implementability
Mechanism design
Studies
Walrasian equilibrium
Welfare economics
Implementability
D86
Assignment problem
Mechanism design
Walrasian equilibrium
D50
Efficient matchings
D82
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Summary:In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient matching between types and goods.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022