Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands

• Published in: Security studies Vol. 15; no. 3; pp. 431 - 463
• Main Author: Oakes, Amy
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London Taylor & Francis Group 01.07.2006; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: American history; Argentina; Armed forces; Conflict; Decision making; Falkland Islands; Falklands War; Foreign relations; Invasions; Military history; Military policy; Military strategy; Political regimes; Reform; Repression; Repression (Political); United Kingdom; Falkland Islands; Argentina
• ISSN: 0963-6412; 1556-1852
• DOI: 10.1080/09636410601028354

Why do states launch diversionary conflicts? In particular, why did Argentina invade the Falkland Islands in 1982? The existing literature tends to analyze diversionary conflict by examining the direct relationship between domestic unrest (the independent variable) and the use of force (the dependent variable). But such an approach ignores critical variables that shape the likelihood of diversionary conflict. When states face domestic unrest, they have a number of options: they can launch a diversionary conflict, they can reform, or they can repress. We therefore need to consider which variables alter the attractiveness of each of these options, employing what I term "the policy alternatives approach." The decision to launch a diversionary conflict may result more from the inability to reform or repress, than it does from the perceived utility of using force to rally the public. An important variable that facilitates or constrains a state's ability to reform or repress is state extractive capacity. The policy alternatives approach enables a new explanation for the invasion of the Falklands, based on the interaction between domestic unrest and low state extractive capacity, and also highlights a number of other variables that may explain diversionary conflicts.