Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts. •New necessary condition for existence...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 123; no. 2; pp. 113 - 117
Main Author Flanagan, Francis X.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.05.2014
Elsevier Science Ltd
Subjects
Allocations
Consistent substitutes
Contracts
Economic models
Economic theory
Market analysis
Matching
Preferences
Stability
Studies
Matching
Stability
C78
D47
C62
Consistent substitutes
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Summary:In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts. •New necessary condition for existence of a stable allocation (matching with contracts).•New sufficient conditions for existence of a stable allocation.•Conditioning on feasible worker preferences allows for new firm preferences.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040