Farmers’ performance and subject pool effect in decentralized bargaining markets

We report results from a decentralized bargaining market experiment conducted with farmers and students. Our results indicate that despite its bad reputation, performance is highly efficient (although not as efficient as the competitive equilibrium prediction). Farmers and students perform similarly...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 115; no. 3; pp. 366 - 368
Main Authors Waichman, Israel, Ness, Christiane
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.06.2012
Elsevier Science Ltd
Subjects
Allocative efficiency
Artefactual field experiment
Bargaining theory
Competitive equilibrium
Decentralized bargaining markets
Economic models
Efficiency
Farmers
Game theory
Pay-off
Students
Studies
Subject pool
D40
Q10
Farmers
Efficiency
Decentralized bargaining markets
Artefactual field experiment
Subject pool
C93
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We report results from a decentralized bargaining market experiment conducted with farmers and students. Our results indicate that despite its bad reputation, performance is highly efficient (although not as efficient as the competitive equilibrium prediction). Farmers and students perform similarly regarding quantities, prices, and allocative efficiencies, but not regarding payoff allocations between buyers and sellers. ► We conducted a decentralized bargaining experiment with both farmers and students. ► We find that performance is highly efficient. ► Nevertheless, it is not as efficient as theory predicts. ► We do not find differences in aggregate performance between farmers and students. ► But farmers assign higher payoffs to buyers than students.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.054